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Abstract
Cooperation in public good games is greatly promoted by positive and
negative incentives. In this paper, we use evolutionary game dynamics to
study the evolution of opportunism (the readiness to be swayed by incen-
tives) and the evolution of trust (the propensity to cooperate in the absence
of information on the co-players). If both positive and negative incentives
are available, evolution leads to a population where defectors are punished
and players cooperate, except when they can get away with defection. Re-
warding behavior does not become fixed, but can play an essential role in
catalyzing the emergence of cooperation, especially if the information level
is low.
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1 Introduction
Social dilemmas are obstacles to the evolution of cooperation. Examples such as
the Prisoner’s Dilemma show that self-interested motives can dictate self-defeating
moves, and thus suppress cooperation. Positive and negative incentives (the car-
rot and the stick) can both induce cooperation in a population of self-regarding
agents (see e.g. Olson 1965, Ostrom & Walker 2003, Sigmund 2007). The pro-
vision of such incentives is costly, however, and therefore raises a second-order
social dilemma. This issue has been addressed in many papers, particularly for
the case of negative incentives. We mention for example Yamagishi 1986, Boyd
& Richerson 1992, Fehr & Ga¨chter 2002, Walker & Halloran 2004, Bowles &
Gintis 2004, Gardner & West 2004, Nakamaru & Iwasa 2006, Sefton et al 2007,
Carpenter 2007, Lehmann et al. 2007 and Kiyonari & Barclay 2008.
It is easily seen that the efficiency of the two types of incentives relies on
contrasting and even complementary circumstances. Indeed, if most players co-
operate, then it will be costly to reward them all, while punishing the few defec-
tions will be cheap: often, the mere threat of a sanction suffices (Boyd et al 2003,
Ga¨chter et al 2008). On the other hand, if most players defect, then punishing
them all will be a costly enterprise, while rewarding the few cooperators will be
cheap. Obviously, therefore, the best policy for turning a population of defectors
into a population of cooperators would be, first, to use the carrot, and at some later
point, the stick.
In the absence of a proper institution to implement such a policy, members of
the population can take the job onto themselves. But what is their incentive to do
so? It pays only if the threat of a punishment, or the promise of a reward, should
turn a co-player from a defector into a cooperator. Hence, the co-players must be
opportunistic, i.e., prone to be swayed by incentives.
In order to impress a co-player, the threat (or promise) of an incentive must be
sufficiently credible. In the following model, we shall assume that the credibility
is provided by the players’ reputation, i.e. by their history, and thus assume several
rounds of the game, not necessarily with the same partner (see e.g. Sigmund et al
2001, Fehr & Fischbacher 2003, Barclay 2006). Credibility could alternatively be
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provided by a verbal commitment, for example. Since mere talk is cheap, how-
ever, such commitments need to be convincing; ultimately, they must be backed
up by actions, and hence again rely on reputation. Whether a player obtains in-
formation about the co-players’ previous actions from direct experience, or from
witnessing them at a distance, or hearing about them through gossip, can be left
open at this stage. In particular, we do not assume repeated rounds between the
same two players, but do not exclude them either. Basically, the carrot or the stick
will be applied after the cooperation, or defection, and hence are forms of targeted
reciprocation (while conversely, of course, the promise to return good with good
and bad with bad, can act as an incentive).
In the following, we present a simple game theoretic model to analyze the
evolution of opportunism, and to stress the smooth interplay of positive and neg-
ative incentives. The model is based on a previous paper (Sigmund et al 2001,
see also Hauert et al 2004), which analyses punishment and reward separately
and which presumes opportunistic agents. Here, we show how such opportunistic
agents evolve via social learning, and how first rewards, then punishment lead to
a society dominated by players who cooperate, except when they expect that they
can get away with defection. Rewards will not become stably established; but
they can play an essential role in the transition to cooperation, especially if the
information level is below a specific threshold. Whenever the benefit-to-cost ratio
for the reward is larger than one, the eventual demise of rewarders is surprising,
since a homogeneous population of rewarding cooperators would obtain a higher
payoff than a homogeneous population of punishing cooperators. We first analyze
the model by means of the replicator dynamics, then by means of a stochastic
learning model based on the Moran process. Thus both finite populations and the
limiting case of infinite populations will be covered. In the discussion, we study
the role of errors, compare our results with experiments and point out the need to
consider a wider role for incentives.
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2 The model
Each round of the game consists of two stages, a helping stage and an incentive
stage. Individuals in the population are randomly paired. A dice decides who is in
the role of the (potential) Donor, and who is Recipient. In the first stage, Donors
may transfer a benefit b to their Recipients, at their own cost c, or they may refuse
to do so. These two alternatives are denoted by C (for cooperation) resp. D (for
defection). In the second stage, Recipients can reward their Donors, or punish
them, or refuse to react. If rewarded, Donors receive an amount β; if punished,
they must part with that amount β; in both cases, Recipients must pay an amount
γ, since both rewarding and punishing is costly. As usual, we assume that c < b,
as well as c < β and γ < b. Using the same parameter values β and γ for both
types of incentives is done for convenience only: basically, all that matters are
the inequalities. They ensure that Donors are better off by choosing C, if their
Recipients use an incentive; and that in the case of rewards, both players have a
positive payoff. But material interests speak against using incentives, since they
are costly; and in the absence of incentives, helping behavior will not evolve.
The four possible moves for the second stage will be denoted by N, to do noth-
ing; P, to punish defection; R, to reward cooperation; and I, to provide for both
types of incentives, i.e. to punish defection and to reward cooperation. For the first
stage, next to the two unconditional movesAllC, to always cooperate, andAllD, to
always defect, we also consider the opportunistic move: namely to defect except
if prodded by an incentive. We shall, however, assume that information about the
co-player may be incomplete. Let µ denote the probability to know whether the
co-player provides an incentive or not, and set µ¯ = 1− µ. We consider two types
of opportunists, who act differently under uncertainty: players of type OC defect
only if they know that their co-player provides no incentive, and players of type
OD defect except if they know that an incentive will be delivered. Hence in the
absence of information, OC players playC andOD-playersD. This yields sixteen
strategies, each given by a pair [i, j], with i ∈ MD := {AllC,OC,OD,AllD}
specifying how the player acts as a Donor and j ∈ MR := {N,P,R, I} how
the player acts as Recipient. If player I is Donor and player II Recipient, the pair
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(pI , pII) of their payoff values is determined by their moves in the corresponding
roles. Hence we can describe these pairs by a 4× 4 matrix (a[ij], b[ij]) given by
∗ N P R I
AllC (−c, b) (−c, b) (β − c, b− γ) (β − c, b− γ)
OC (−µ¯c, µ¯b) (−c, b) (β − c, b− γ) (β − c, b− γ)
OD (0, 0) (−µc− µ¯β, µb− µ¯γ) (µ(β − c), µ(b− γ)) (−(1− 2µ)β − µc, µb− γ)
AllD (0, 0) (−β,−γ) (0, 0) (−β,−γ)
This specifies the payoff values for the corresponding symmetrized game,
which is given by a 16 × 16-matrix. A player using [i, j] against a player us-
ing [k, l] is with equal probability in the role of the Donor or the Recipient and
hence obtains as payoff (a[i,l] + b[k,j])/2. The state of the population x = (x[i,j])
is given by the frequencies of the 16 strategies.
There exist a wealth of possible evolutionary dynamics, describing how the
frequencies of the strategies change with time under the influence of social learn-
ing (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998). We shall consider only one updating mech-
anism, but stress that the results hold in many other cases too. For the learning
rule, we shall use the familiar Moran-like ’death-birth’ process (Nowak 2006):
we thus assume that occasionally, players can update their strategy by copying the
strategy of a ’model’, i.e., a player chosen at random with a probability which is
proportional to that player’s fitness. This fitness in turn is assumed to be a convex
combination (1− s)B+ sP , where B is a ’baseline fitness’ (the same for all play-
ers), P is the payoff (which depends on the model’s strategy, and the state of the
population), and 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 measures the ’strenght of selection’, i.e. the impor-
tance of the game for overall fitness. (We shall always assume s small enough to
avoid negative fitness values). This learning rule corresponds to aMarkov process.
The rate for switching from strategy [k, l] to strategy [i, j] is (1 − s)B + sP[i,j],
independently of [k, l].
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2.1 Large populations
The learning rule leads, in the limiting case of an infinitely large population, to
the replicator equation for the relative frequencies x[ij]: the growth rate of any
strategy is given by the difference between its payoff and the average payoff in
the population (Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998). This yields an ordinary differential
equation which can be analyzed in a relatively straightforward way, despite being
15-dimensional.
Let us first note that I is weakly dominated by P, in the sense that I-players
never do better, and sometimes less well, than P-players. Hence, no state where
all the strategies are played can be stationary. The population always evolves
towards a region where at least one strategy is missing. Furthermore, AllC is
weakly dominated by OC, and All D by OD. This allows to reduce the dynamics
to lower dimensional cases. Of particular relevance are the states where only two
strategies are present, and where these two strategies prescribe the same move
in one of the two stages of the game. The outcome of such pairwise contests is
mostly independent of the parameter values, with three exceptions:
(a) In a homogeneous OC-population, R dominates N if and only if µ >
γ
b
;
(b) In a homogeneous OD-population, P dominates N if and only if µ >
γ
b+γ
;
(c) In a homogeneous OD-population, P dominates R if and only if µ > 1/2.
In each case, it is easy to understand why higher reputation will have the corre-
sponding effect. Owing to our assumption γ < b, all these thresholds for µ lie in
the open interval (0,1).
One can obtain a good representation of the dynamics by looking at the situ-
ations where there are two alternatives for the first stage (namely AllD and OC,
or AllD and OD, or OC and OD), and the three alternatives N, P and R for the
second stage. In each such case, the state space of the population can be visual-
ized by a prism (Fig. 1). Here, each of its ’square faces’ stands for the set of all
mixed populations with only four strategies present. For instance, if the popula-
tion consists only of the four strategies [OC,N], [OC,R], [OD,N, ] and [OD,R],
then the state corresponds to a point in the three dimensional simplex spanned
by the corresponding four monomorphic populations. But since the double ra-
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tios x[ij]x[kl]/x[il]x[kj] are invariant under the replicator dynamics (see Hofbauer
& Sigmund 1998, pp. 122–125), the state cannot leave the corresponding two-
dimensional surface, which may be represented by a square (see Fig. 2).
For several pairs of strategies (such as [OC,P] and [AllC,P], or [AllD,N
and [OD,N]), all populations which are mixtures of the corresponding two strate-
gies are stationary. There is no selective force favouring one strategy over the
other. We shall assume that in this case, small random shocks will cause the state
to evolve through neutral drift. This implies that evolution then leads ultimately
to [OC,P], and hence to a homogeneous population which stably cooperates in
the most efficient way. Indeed, it is easy to see that no other strategy can in-
vade a monomorphic [OC,P]-population through selection. The only flaw is that
[AllC,P] can enter through neutral drift. Nevertheless, [OC,P] is a Nash equi-
librium.
But how can [OC,P] get off the ground? Let us first consider what happens
if the possibility to play R, i.e. to reward a cooperative move, is excluded. The
asocial strategy [AllD,N] is stable. It can at best be invaded through neutral
drift by [OD,N]. If µ > γ/(b + γ), this can in turn be invaded by [OD,P],
which then leads to [OC,P]. If µ is smaller, however, that path is precluded
and the population would remain in an un-cooperative state. It is in this case
that the R-alternative plays an essential role. By neutral drift, [AllD,R] can
invade [AllD,N]. More importantly, [OD,R] dominates [OD,N], [AllD,R]
and [AllD,N]. From [OD,R], the way to [OC,R] and then to [OC,P] is easy.
The essential step of that evolution occurs in the transition from OD to OC,
when players start cooperating by default, i.e., in the absence of information (see
the third column in Fig. 1). If the R-alternative is not available, then for small
values of µ, the population can be trapped in [OD,N]. But if the R-alternative
can be used, it can switch from [OD,N] to [OD,R] . In a population where the
first move is eitherOD orOR, and the second move eitherN orR, there is a (four-
membered) Rock-Paper-Scissors cycle, see Fig. 2: one strategy is superseded by
the next. There exists a unique stationary state where these four alternatives are
used. We show in the electronic supplementary material that for µ < γ/2b, this
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stationary state cannot be invaded by any strategy using P. But due to the Rock-
Paper-Scissors dynamics, it is inherently unstable. The population will eventually
use mostly strategy [OC,R]. There, the strategy [OC,P] can invade and become
fixed.
In the competition between [OD,N] and [OC,P], the latter is dominant if and
only if µ > (c + γ)/(c + γ + b) (a condition which is independent of β). If
not, then the competition is bistable, meaning that neither strategy can invade a
homogeneous population adopting the other strategy. An equal mixture of both
strategies converges to the pro-social strategy [OC,P] if and only if µ(β − 2c −
2b− γ) < β − 2c− γ. In the case γ = β, this simply reduces to µ > c/(c + b).
We thus obtain a full classification of the replicator dynamics in terms of the
parameter µ. The main bifurcation values are γ
2b
< γ
b+γ
< γ
b
and 1
2
. These can
be arranged in two ways, depending on whether b < 2γ or not. But the basic
outcome is the same in both case (see Fig. 1 and the electronic supplement).
It is possible to modify this model by additionally taking into account the
recombination of the traits affecting the first and the second stage of the game.
Indeed, recombination does not only occur for genetic transmission of strategies,
but also for social learning. A modification of an argument from Gaunersdorfer
et al. (1991) allows to show that in this case, the double ratios x[ij]x[kl]/x[il]x[kj]
converge to 1, so that the traits for the first and the second stage of the game
become statistically independent of each other. Hence the previous analysis still
holds. In Lehmann et al. (2007) and Lehmann & Rousset (2009) it is shown, in
contrast, that recombination greatly affects the outcome in a lattice and in a finite
population model without reputational effects.
2.2 Small mutation rates
In the case of a finite population of sizeM , the learning process corresponds to a
Markov chain on a state space which consists of the frequencies of all the strate-
gies (which sum up to M ). The absorbing states correspond to the homogeneous
populations: in such a homogeneous population, imitation cannot introduce any
change. If we add to the learning process a ’mutation rate’ (or more precisely, an
8
exploration rate), by assuming that players can also adopt a strategy by chance,
rather than imitation, then the corresponding process is recurrent (a chain of tran-
sitions can lead from every state to every other) and it admits a unique stationary
distribution. This stationary distribution describes the frequencies of the states in
the long run. It is in general laborious to compute, since the number of possible
states grows polynomially in M . However, in the limiting case of a very small
exploration rate (the so-called adiabatic case), we can assume that the population
is mostly in a homogeneous state, and we can compute the transition probabilities
between these states (Nowak 2006). This limiting case is based on the assumption
that the fate of mutant (i.e., whether it will be eliminated or fixed in the popu-
lation) is decided before the next mutation occurs. We can confirm the results
from the replicator dynamics. For simplicity, we confine ourselves to the non-
dominated strategies OC, OD, resp. N, P and R; similar results can be obtained
by considering the full strategy space.
In the stationary distribution, the population is dominated by the strategy
[OC,P], but for smaller values of µ, it needs the presence of the R-alternative
to emerge. This becomes particularly clear if one looks at the transition probabili-
ties (see electronic supplementary material). Except for large values of µ, only the
strategy [OD,R] can invade the asocial [OD,N] with a fixation probability which
is larger than the neutral fixation probability 1/M .
If [OC,P] dominates [OD,N], or when it fares best in an equal mixture of
both strategies, then it needs not the help of R-players to become the most fre-
quent strategy in the long run (i.e. in the stationary distribution). But for smaller
values of µ, rewards are essential. In Fig. 3, it is shown that that the existence
of rewarding strategies allows the social strategy [OC,P] to supersede the asocial
[OD,N] even in cases in which the players have hardly any information about
their co-players. The time until the system leaves [OD,N] is greatly reduced if
rewarding is available (see Fig. 4). In the electronic supplementary material it is
shown that the state [OC,P] is usually reached from [OC,R], while the strategy
most likely to invade the asocial [OD,N] is [OD,R]. These outcomes are robust,
and depend little on the parameter choices. Moreover, they are barely affected
9
by the mutation structure. If, instead of assuming that all mutations are equally
likely, we only allow for mutations in the behavior in one of the two stages (i.e.,
no recombination between the corresponding traits), the result is very similar. Ap-
parently, if it is impossible to mutate directly from [OD,N] to [OC,P], then the
detour via [OD,P] works almost as well.
Even for the limiting case µ = 0 (no reputation effects), the role of rewards
is strongly noticeable. Without rewards, the stationary probability of the asocial
strategy [OD,N] is close to 100 percent; with the possibility of rewards, it is
considerably reduced.
3 Discussion
We have analyzed a two-person, two-stages game. It is well-known that it cor-
responds to a simplified version of the Ultimatum game (Gu¨th et al. 1982), in
the punishment case, or of the Trust game (Berg et al. 1995), in the reward case
(De Silva & Sigmund 2009, Sigmund 2010). Similar results also hold for the N-
person Public Good game with reward and punishment (e.g. Hauert et al. 2004).
However, the many-person game offers a wealth of variants having an interest of
their own (as, for instance, when players decide to mete out punishment only if
they have a majority on their side; see Boyd et al., to appear). In this paper, we
have opted for the simplest set-up and considered pairwise interactions only.
In classical economic thought, positive and negative incentives have often
been treated on equal footing, so to speak (Olson 1965). In evolutionary game
theory, punishing is studied much more frequently than rewarding. The relevance
of positive incentives is sometimes queried, on the ground that helping behavior
makes only sense if there is an asymmetry in resource level between donor and
recipient. If A has a high pile of wood, and B has no fuel, A can give some wood
away at little cost, and provide a large benefit to B. This is the cooperative act.
Where is the positive incentive? It would be absurd to imagine that B rewards A
by returning the fuel. But B can reward A by donating some other resource, such
as food, or fire, which A is lacking.
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In experimental economics, punishing behavior has been studied considerably
more often than rewarding behavior (Yamagishi 1986; Fehr & Ga¨chter 2002; Bar-
clay 2006; Dreber et al. 2008). In the last few years, there has been a substantial
amount of empirical work on the interplay of the two forms of incentives (An-
dreoni et al. 2003; Rockenbach &Milinski 2006; Sefton et al. 2007). The results,
with two exceptions to be discussed presently, confirm our theoretical conclu-
sion: punishment is the more lasting factor, but the combination of reward and
punishment works best. This outcome is somewhat surprising, because in most
experiments, players are anonymous and know that they cannot build up a reputa-
tion. One significant exception is the investigation, in Fehr & Fischbacher (2003),
of the Ultimatum game, which has essentially the same structure as our two-stage
game with punishment. In that case, the treatment without information on the
co-player’s past behavior yields a noticeably lower level of cooperation than the
treatment with information. Nevertheless, even in the no-information treatment,
both the level of cooperation (in the form of fair sharing) and of punishment (in
the form of rejection of small offers) are remarkably high.
A serious criticism of the model presented in this paper is thus that it does
not seem to account for the pro-social behavior shown by players who know that
reputation-building is impossible. We believe that this effect is due to a mal-
adaptation. Our evolutionary past has not prepared us to expect anonymity. In
hunter-gatherer societies and in rural life, it is not often that one can really be sure
to be unobserved. Even in modern life, the long phase of childhood is usually
spent under the watchful eyes of parents, educators or age-peers. Ingenious ex-
periments uncover our tendency to over-react to the slightest cues indicating that
somebody may be watching (for instance, the mere picture of an eye, see Haley &
Fessler 2005 and Bateson et al. 2006, or three dots representing eyes and mouth,
see Rigdon et al. 2009). The idea of personal deities scrutinizing our behavior,
which seems to be almost universal, is probably a projection of this deep-seated
conviction (Johnson & Bering 2006). The concept of conscience was famously
described, by Mencken, as ’the inner voice that warns us somebody may be look-
ing’ (cf. Levin 2009).
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In several experimental papers, however, the role of reputation is very explicit.
In Rand et al. (2009), players are engaged in fifty rounds of the Public Goods
game with incentives, always with the same three partners. Hence they know the
past actions of their co-players. In this case, we can be sure that µ > γ/b. Thus in
a homogeneous OC-population, R should dominate N. Moreover, as the leverage
for both punishment and reward is 1:3 in this experiment (as in many others), an
[OC,R]-population obtains a payoff b − c + β − γ which is substantially larger
than that of an [OC,P]-population. In the experiment, rewarding performs indeed
much better than punishing, and Rand et al. conclude that ’Positive reciprocity
should play a larger role than negative reciprocity in maintaining public coopera-
tion in repeated situations.’
Nevertheless, according to our model, P-players ought to invade. This seems
counter-intuitive. Punishers do not have to pay for an incentive (since everyone
cooperates), but they will nevertheless be rewarded, since they cooperate in the
Public Goods stage. Thus [OC,P] should take over, thereby lowering the average
payoff. By contrast, in the repeated game considered by Rand et al., it is clear
that cooperative players who have not been rewarded by their co-player in the
previous round will feel cheated, and stop rewarding that co-player. They will not
be impressed by the fact that the co-player is still providing an incentive by pun-
ishing defectors instead. In other words, in this experiment rewards are not only
seen as incentives, but as contributions in their own right, in a Repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. Players will reciprocate not only for the Public Goods behavior,
but for the ’mutual reward game’ too. In fact, if there had been two players only in
the experiment by Rand et al, it would reduce to a Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
game with 100 rounds.
This aspect is not covered in our model, where the incentives are only trig-
gered by the behavior in the Public Goods stage, but not by previous incentives. In
particular, rewarding behavior cannot be rewarded, and fines do not elicit counter-
punishment. This facilitates the analysis of incentives as instruments for promot-
ing cooperation, but it obscures the fact that in real life, incentives have to be
viewed as economic exchanges in their own right.
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A similar experiment as in Rand et al. was studied by Milinski et al. (2002),
where essentially the Public Goods rounds alternate with an indirect reciprocity
game (see also Panchanathan & Boyd 2006). Helping, in such an indirect reci-
procity game, is a form of reward. In Milinski’s experiment, punishment was not
allowed, but in Rockenbach & Milinski (2006), both types of incentives could be
used. Groups were rearranged between rounds, as players could decide whether
to leave or to stay. Players knew each other’s past behavior in the previous public
goods rounds and the indirect reciprocity rounds (but not their punishing behav-
ior). It was thus possible to acquire a reputation as a rewarder, but not as a pun-
isher. This treatment usually led to a very cooperative outcome, with punishment
focused on the worst cheaters, and a significant interaction between reward and
punishment.
In our numerical examples, we have usually assumed γ = β, but stress that
this does not affect the basic outcome (see electronic supplementary material for
the case γ < β). In most experiments, the leverage of the incentive is assumed to
be stronger. Clearly, this encourages the Recipients to use incentives (Carpenter
2006; Egas & Riedl 2007; Vyrastekova & van Soest 2008). But it has been shown
(Carpenter 2006; Sefton et al. 2007) that many are willing to punish exploiters
even if it reduces their own account by as much as that of the punished player.
In the Trust game, it is also usually assumed that the second stage is a zero-sum
game. In most of the (relatively few) experiments on rewarding, the leverage is
1:1 (Walker & Halloran 2004; Sefton et al. 2007), in Rockenbach & Milinski and
Rand et al it is 1:3. In Vyrastekova & van Soest (2008), it is shown that increasing
this leverage makes rewarding more efficient. In our view, it is natural to assume
a high benefit-to-cost ratio in the first stage (the occasion for a Public Goods game
is precisely the situation when mutual help is needed), but it is less essential that
a high leverage also applies in the second stage. Punishment, for instance, can be
very costly it the other player retaliates, as seems quite natural to expect (at least
in pairwise interactions; in N-person games, sanctions can be inexpensive if the
majority punishes a single cheater).
For the sake of simplicity, we have not considered the probability of errors in
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implementation. But it can be checked in a straightforward way that the results
are essentially unchanged if we assume that with a small probability ǫ > 0, an
intended donation fails (either due to a mistake of the player, or to unfavorable
conditions). The other type of errors in implementation (namely helping without
wanting it) seems considerably less plausible. We note that in a homogeneous
[OC,P]-population, usually there is no need to punish co-players, and hence no
way of building up a reputation as a punisher. But if errors in implementation
occur, there will be opportunities for punishers to reveal their true colours. In
Sigmund (2010), it is shown that if there are sufficiently many rounds of the game,
occasional errors will provide enough opportunities for building up a reputation.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Dynamics of a population consisting of OC and AllD (left column),
AllD and OD (middle column) resp. OC and OD (right column). Black cir-
cles represent Nash-equilibria, white circles indicate unstable fixed points. The
arrows on the edges indicate the direction of the dynamics if only the two strate-
gies corresponding to the end-points are present. The orange grid is the manifold
that separates initial values with different asymptotic behavior. The blue curves
represent the typical dynamics for a given initial population. Parameter values:
b = 4, c = 1, β = γ = 2 and µ = 30% (hence γ
2b
< µ < γ
γ+b
).
Figure 2: The state space of a game involving the four strategies [OC,N],
[OC,R], [OD,N] and [OD,R]. The corners of the three-dimensional simplex
correspond to the homogeneous populations using that strategy, the interior points
denote mixed populations. For each initial state, the evolution of the system is
restricted to a two-dimensional saddle-like manifold that can be represented by a
square (right). If µ < γ
b
, the competition between these four strategies is charac-
terized by a rock-paper-scissors like dynamics, as indicated by the orientation of
the edges.
Figure 3: Strategy selection in finite and infinite populations, depending on
the information parameter µ. The left column shows the outcome of a simu-
lation of the replicator equation for 1,000 randomly chosen initial populations.
If only punishment is available to sway opportunistic behavior, then cooperative
outcomes become more likely if µ exceeds roughly 1/3 (in which case [OC,P]
becomes fixed). As soon as rewards are also allowed, punishment-enforced co-
operation becomes predominant as soon as µ > γ/2b = 1/4. Additionally,
for smaller values of µ the population may tend to cycle between the strategies
[OC,R], [OC,N], [OD,N] and [OD,R], represented by the orange line in the
lower left graph.
The right column shows the stationary distribution of strategies in a finite popu-
lation. Again, without rewards a considerably higher information level µ is nec-
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essary to promote punishment-enforced cooperation (either [OC,P] or [OD,P]);
note that both opportunist strategies become indistinguishable in the limit case of
complete information. In finite populations, rewarding strategies act merely as a
catalyst for the emergence of punishment; even for small µ, the outcomes [OC,R]
resp. [OD,R] never prevail.
Parameter values: b = 4, c = 1, β = γ = 2. For finite populations, the population
size isM = 100 and the selection strength s = 1/10.
Figure 4: Average number of mutations needed until a population of [OD,N]
players is successfully invaded. Adding the possibility of rewards reduces the
waiting time considerably (for µ = 0% it takes 500 mutations with rewards and al-
most 500,000 mutations without). As the information level increases, this catalytic
effect of rewarding disappears. Parameter values: Population size M = 100, se-
lection strength s = 1/10; b = 4, c = 1, β = γ = 2.
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Incentives and Opportunism: from the Carrot to the Stick
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1 Large populations
1.1 The dynamics on a prism
If we consider the two strategies OC and OD in the first stage and the alternatives P, N and R for the
second, we obtain (up to a factor 1/2) the following payoff matrix:
[OC,N] [OD,N] [OC,R] [OD,R] [OC,P] [OD,P]
[OC,N] µ¯(b− c) −µ¯c β − c + µ¯b β − c µ¯b− c −c
[OD,N] µ¯b 0 µ(β − c) + µ¯b µ(β − c) µ¯(b− β)− µc −µc− µ¯β
[OC,R] b− γ − µ¯c µ(b− γ)− µ¯c b− c + β − γ β − c + µ(b− γ) b− c− γ −c + µ(b− γ)
[OD,R] b− γ µ(b− γ) b− γ + µ(β − c) µ(b− c + β − γ) b− γ − µc− µ¯β µ(b− γ − c)− µ¯β
[OC,P] b− µ¯c µb− µ¯(γ + c) b− c + β β − c + µb− µ¯γ b− c −c + µb− µ¯γ
[OD,P] b µb− µ¯γ b + µ(β − c) µ(b− c + β)− µ¯γ b− µc− µ¯β µ(b− c) + µ¯(β − γ)
(1)
Let x[i,j](t) denote the fraction of players with strategy [i, j] at time t. As the sum of the first and the
fourth row equals the sum of the second and third row, one can easily verify that
VNR(t) =
x[OC,N](t) · x[OD,R](t)
x[OC,R](t) · x[OD,N](t)
(2)
is invariant under replicator dynamics (see Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998). Analogously,
VNP = x[OC,N]x[OD,P]/
(
x[OC,P]x[OD,N]
)
is an invariant of motion. This, together with the condition
that the sum of all x[i,j] equals one, reduces the 6-dimensional problem to a 3-dimensional system which can
be represented by a prism.
1.2 A classification of the dynamics
If we return to the more convenient bimatrix notation, the game between the two strategies OC and OD is
represented by
∗ N P R
OC (−µ¯c, µ¯b) (−c, b) (β − c, b− γ)
OD (0, 0) (−µc− µ¯β, µb− µ¯γ) (µ(β − c), µ(b− γ))
in which the first entry denotes the payoff of the row player and the second entry the payoff of the
column player. From this representation we may conclude that
1. In a homogeneous OC population, P always dominates N and R. Additionally, an R player obtains
a higher payoff than an N player if and only if b− γ > µ¯b, i.e. iff
µ > γ/b (3)
1
2. Similarly, in a homogeneous OD population, N is always dominated by R. N is also dominated by
P iff µb− µ¯γ > 0, i.e. iff
µ > γ/(b + γ) (4)
P also dominates R iff µb− µ¯γ > µ(b− γ), i.e. iff
µ > 1/2 (5)
3. If incentives are used (P or R), OC dominates OD; in the absence of incentives (N), this relation is
reversed.
In particular, it follows that N is strictly dominated by P if µ > γ/(b + γ). Iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies then leads to the conclusion that the only possible outcome of the dynamics is [OC,P].
However, if µ < γ/(b + γ) we find a more interesting behaviour. There is a uniqe fixed point M in the
interior of the square spanned by the strategies [OC,N], [OC,R], [OD,N] and [OD,R]. This fixed point
is surrounded by spiralling orbits (see Fig. 1). The asymptotic behaviour of these orbits depends on the
initial condition: If VNR(0) < 1, all orbits converge to the boundary of the square; if VNR(0) > 1, M is a
global attractor; and finally, if VNR(0) = 1, M is surrounded by periodic orbits (see Hofbauer & Sigmund
1998). Independently of the initial condition, a population in this fixed point M obtains a payoff of
µ
(
−b + c− c2/β + b2/γ
)
,
whereas both absent strategies, [OC,P] and [OD,P]would obtain the payoff−γ+µ
(
b + c− c2/β + b2/γ
)
.
Hence, a population in M can be invaded by punishers if and only if
µ > γ/(2b) (6)
Figure 1: In the square spanned by OC, OD resp. N and R, the orbits cycle around the fixed point M .
If we also allow for the strategies AllC and AllD we do not see any additional bifurcations as the
payoffs of these strategies do not depend on µ. Hence, the dynamics of the game is fully described by the
thresholds (3) - (6), which can be arranged in two possible ways:
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1. If γ < b/2, we have γ2b <
γ
γ+b <
γ
b
< 1/2;
2. Otherwise we obtain γ2b <
γ
γ+b < 1/2 <
γ
b
However, both cases induce the same long-term dynamics (see also Fig. 2, which depicts the border-
line case γ = b/2): For any value of µ, a population consisting of OC and AllD evolves either towards
punishment enforced cooperation, [OC,P], or towards a purely selfish regime, [AllD,N] resp. [AllD,R]
(Fig. 2, first column). As AllD is always weakly dominated by its opportunistic counterpart, OD might
invade (Fig. 2, second column).
In this case the eventual outcome depends on the information level: If µ > γ/(b + γ), [OC,P] mutants
succeed in an OD population and lead to stable cooperation, independently of the additional inequalities
µ > 1/2 or µ > γ/b (Fig. 2, last two graphs in the last column). For µ < γ/(b + γ), however, only the
possibility of rewards allows an OC minority to invade a homogeneous OD population, which may lead to
oscillations between reward-driven cooperation and defection. If µ > γ/(2b) these cycles are unstable and
open the way for [OC,P] (Fig. 2, upper two graphs in the last column).
1.3 Recombination
Classical replicator dynamics does not introduce new strategies (see Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998). For exam-
ple, [OC,N] remains absent if it is not played in the initial population even if both pure strategies OC and
N exist (e.g. if the initial population consists of [OC,P] and [OD,N] players). In this section we introduce
recombination, thereby extending the work of Gaunersdorfer et al. (1991).
We consider a general 2xn role game with strategies e1 and e2 in the first stage and strategies f1, ..., fn
in the second. The fraction of players using strategy [ei, fj] is denoted by xij ; furthermore we define the
fraction of all players using strategy ei by pi :=
∑n
k=1 xik and the fraction of all players using fj by
qj :=
∑2
k=1 xkj . Hence, if the payoffs of the game are given by the bimatrix
f1 . . . fn
e1 (a11, b11) . . . (a1n, b1n)
e2 (a21, b21) . . . (a2n, b2n)
then an [ei, fj] player obtains the payoff mij =
1
2
( ∑n
k=1 aik · qk
)
+ 12
( ∑2
k=1 bkj · pk
)
. Then the average
payoff of the population is given by M¯ :=
∑2
i=1
∑n
j=1 mij · xij . The replicator dynamics of this system is
given by
x˙ij = xij ·
[
mij − M¯
]
. (7)
By an analogous argument as in section 1.1 the double ratios
Zk :=
x11 · x2k
x21 · x1k
(8)
3
µ < γ
2b
= 1/4
γ
2b
< µ < γ
γ+b
= 1/3
γ
γ+b
< µ < γ
b
= 1/2
µ > 1/2
Figure 2: Replicator dynamics for b = 4, c = 1, β = γ = 2 and µ = 15%, 30%, 45% resp. µ = 60%. The
arrows on the edges indicate the direction of the dynamics if all other strategies are absent. Black points
represent Nash-equilibria, white points indicate unstable fixed points. The orange grid is the manifold that
separates initial values with different asymptotic behaviour (i.e., a separatrix). The blue curves represent the
typical dynamics for a given initial population.
Note that this choice of parameters implies γ/b = 1/2; therefore there occur two bifurcations between the
third and the fourth row (in the last rowR dominates N in a homogeneous OC population and P dominates
R in a homogeneous OD population). The dynamics in the interior of the prism, however, is the same no
matter whether γ/b < 1/2 or γ/b > 1/2. 4
are invariants of motion for 1 ≤ k ≤ n under replicator dynamics, i.e., Z˙k = 0 in the interior of the state
space (clearly, Z1 is constant to 1). In particular this holds true for theWright manifold
W :=
{
(xij) : Zk = 1 for all 2 ≤ k ≤ n
}
. (9)
Now we modify the replicator dynamics (7) by adding recombination:
x˙ij = xij ·
[
mij − M¯
]
− ρDij . (10)
Here ρ > 0 is the recombination fraction and Dij := xij − pi · qj is the linkage disequilibrium. (In an
infinitesimal time interval of length ∆t, the combination [ij] is broken up with probability (1 − ρ)∆t, and
formed anew with probability ρpi · qj∆t.)
Proposition (Convergence to the Wright manifold)
Under the modified replicator equation (10), all orbits starting in the interior of the state space converge to
the Wright manifold. On this manifold, the modified and the classical replicator dynamics coincide.
Proof. We only show Z2 → 1, all other Zk follow by a symmetry argument. We have
Z˙2
Z2
= −ρ ·
[
D11/x11 + D22/x22 −D12/x12 −D21/x21
]
(11)
It is easy to see that
D11/x11 = 1−
p1q1
x11
= 1− (x11+···+x1n)(x11+x21)
x11
=
= 1− x11 − · · · − x1n − x21 −
x12x21
x11
− · · · −
x1nx21
x11
=
= x22 + · · ·+ x2n −
1
Z2
x22 − · · · −
1
Zn
x2n =
= (1− 1/Z2)x22 + (1− 1/Z3)x23 + · · ·+ (1− 1/Zn)x2n,
(12)
hence
D11/x11 =
∑n
k=1(1−
Z1
Zk
)x2k (13)
and analogously
D12/x12 =
∑n
k=1(1−
Z2
Zk
)x2k
D22/x22 =
∑n
k=1(1−
Zk
Z2
)x1k
D21/x21 =
∑n
k=1(1−
Zk
Z1
)x1k
(14)
Plugging these identities into eq. (11) yields
Z˙2
Z2
= −ρ(Z2 − 1)[
n∑
k=1
(
x2k
Zk
+
x1kZk
Z1Z2
)] = −ρ(Z2 − 1)[p1
x21
x11
+ p2
x12
x22
]
which shows that Z2 (and therefore all Zk) converge to 1 monotonically. In this case it follows from eqs.
(13) and (14) that Dij → 0.
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We can employ this result on our original game: As AllC is weakly dominated by OC and AllD by
OD, we may confine ourselves on the two opportunistic strategies in the first stage. If we consider the
options P, R and N for the second stage we have a 2x3 role game. Then the previous proposition ensures
that all orbits starting in the interior of the state space converge to the generalized Wright manifold where
the dynamics coincides with the classical replicator equation.
2 Small mutation rates
2.1 Transition probabilities
The transition probabilities for the adiabatic case are calculated according to Nowak (2006), see also Sig-
mund (2010). The following tables (aij) show the fixation probabilities of a mutant i, invading a resident
strategy j for different values of µ. For low mutation rates, [OD,R] is the only strategy which can invade
the asocial [OD,N] with a higher probability than 1/M (the neutral fixation probability).
Parameter values: M = 100, s = 1/10, b = 4, c = 1, β = γ = 2.
µ = 10% [OC,N] [OC,R] [OC,P] [OD,N] [OD,R] [OD,P]
[OC,N] 0.010 0.162 0.001 0.000 0.068 0.204
[OC,R] 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.088 0.229
[OC,P] 0.041 0.202 0.010 0.000 0.014 0.085
[OD,N] 0.094 0.074 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.138
[OD,R] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.010 0.158
[OD,P] 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010
µ = 30% [OC,N] [OC,R] [OC,P] [OD,N] [OD,R] [OD,P]
[OC,N] 0.010 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.001
[OC,R] 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.005 0.069 0.078
[OC,P] 0.120 0.202 0.010 0.005 0.036 0.066
[OD,N] 0.073 0.018 0.000 0.010 0.002 0.022
[OD,R] 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.010 0.078
[OD,P] 0.177 0.049 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.010
µ = 50% [OC,N] [OC,R] [OC,P] [OD,N] [OD,R] [OD,P]
[OC,N] 0.010 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[OC,R] 0.009 0.010 0.000 0.048 0.049 0.001
[OC,P] 0.201 0.202 0.010 0.071 0.072 0.047
[OD,N] 0.052 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000
[OD,R] 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.010 0.009
[OD,P] 0.246 0.137 0.001 0.102 0.011 0.010
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2.2 Typical transitions between states
For different information levels, the following table displays the distribution of strategies which succeed in
invading a homogeneous [OD,N] population. For small information levels especially, [OD,R] is best at
overcoming this asocial state. The table shows the result of a simulation of the stochastic process with 107
mutations, population size M = 100, selection strength s = 1/10, b = 4, c = 1, β = γ = 2.
[OC,N] [OC,R] [OC,P] [OD,N] [OD,R] [OD,P]
µ = 0% 0.000 0.001 0.000 − 0.999 0.000
µ = 10% 0.000 0.003 0.001 − 0.996 0.000
µ = 20% 0.000 0.017 0.011 − 0.970 0.002
µ = 30% 0.000 0.068 0.040 − 0.858 0.034
µ = 40% 0.000 0.191 0.191 − 0.381 0.238
The next table displays the distribution of strategies which immediately preceded a homogeneous [OC,P]
populations. If there is little information about co-players, the state of punishing cooperators is mostly
reached via rewards (Simulation with 107 mutations, M = 100, s = 1/10, b = 4, c = 1, β = γ = 2).
[OC,N] [OC,R] [OC,P] [OD,N] [OD,R] [OD,P]
µ = 0% 0.228 0.644 − 0.000 0.128 0.000
µ = 10% 0.394 0.457 − 0.002 0.144 0.004
µ = 20% 0.234 0.479 − 0.014 0.212 0.062
µ = 30% 0.098 0.419 − 0.018 0.211 0.254
µ = 40% 0.014 0.169 − 0.008 0.205 0.604
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2.3 Cheap incentives (γ < β)
In the main article we have usually assumed γ = β. The following figure shows the case of ”cheap” incen-
tives, γ < β. Note that the qualitative behavior remains unchanged; there is only a marginal difference to
the case with γ = β which is depicted in the right column of Fig. 3 in the main manuscript.
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Figure 3: Stationary distribution in the case of ”cheap” incentives. If γ < β, a homogeneous population of
rewarding cooperators would obtain the maximum payoff. But evolution still leads to the stick instead of
the carrot.
Parameter values: Population size M = 100, selection strength s = 1/10; b = 4, c = 1, β = 2, γ = 3/4.
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